Department of Economics

2005 Working Papers

Breadcrumb

Das Human-Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure

2005-14 | Oded Galor and Omer Moav

Can Endogenously Chosen Institutions Mitigate the Free-Rider Problem and Reduce Perverse Punishment?

2005-13 | Arhan Ertan, Talbot Page and Louis Putterman

Constrained Inefficiency in GEI: A Geometric Argument

2005-12 | Mario Tirelli

Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value

2005-11 | Geoffroy de Clippel and Roberto Serrano

Multiple Equilibria as a Difficulty in Understanding Correlated Distributions

2005-10 | Anirban Kar, Indrajit Ray and Roberto Serrano

Communication and Punishment in Voluntary Contribution Experiments

2005-9 | Olivier Bochet, Talbot Page and Louis Putterman

Managerial Reputation Concerns, Outside Monitoring, and Investment Efficiency

2005-8 | Lily Qiu

Accounting for the Effect of Health on Economic Growth

2005-7 | David N. Weil

Future Industrial Organization and Stock Returns versus the Decision to Issue IPOs

2005-6 | Gerard Hoberg and Lily Qiu

Not Just Babble: A Voluntary Contribution Experiment with Iterative Numerical Messages

2005-5 | Olivier Bochet and Louis Putterman

Social Capability, History and the Economies of Communist and Post-Communist States

2005-4 | Peter Iliev and Louis Putterman

Land Inequality and the Emergence of Human Capital Promoting Institutions

2005-3 | Oded Galor, Omer Moav and Dietrich Vollrath

An Axiomatization of the Inner Core Using Appropriate Reduced Games

2005-2 | Geoffroy de Clippel

Information Transmission in Coalitional Voting Games

2005-1 | Roberto Serrano and Rajiv Vohra